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The past two decades have witnessed an unprecedented globalisation of trade in goods 
and services. This process has been driven, inter alia, by technology, ideology and the 
availability of relatively cheap energy. By extrapolating this trend, one may expect further 
integration of world markets and increasingly unhindered international trade. However, 
there is mounting evidence of signifi cant risks to global trade, at least in goods and 
possibly in certain services as well. Three main risk areas are identifi ed here: (1) fossil fuel 
depletion, in particular a possible peak in world oil production within the next fi ve to ten 
years; (2) climate change, and especially its effects on agricultural production, transport 
and fi nancial risk; and (3) instability in the world fi nancial system caused primarily by 
the US’s unsustainable twin defi cits. The paper explores some possible implications of 
these risks for the South African economy and its foreign trade in particular. It argues that 
South Africa’s trade policy should take due cognizance of these threats, and advocates 
adaptation and mitigation strategies designed to improve self-suffi ciency and to protect 
the poor in sensitive areas, especially food and energy security. 
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  1. Introduction
The past couple of decades have witnessed an unprecedented globalisation of trade in 
goods and services. This process has been driven, inter alia, by technology, ideology and 
the availability of relatively cheap energy. By extrapolating this trend, one may expect 
further integration of world markets and increasingly unhindered international trade. 
However, there is mounting evidence of signifi cant risks to the globalisation of free trade, 
at least in goods and possibly in certain services as well. 
Three main risk areas are identifi ed in this paper: (1) fossil fuel depletion, in particular 
a possible peak in world oil production within the next fi ve to ten years; (2) climate 
change, and especially its effect on agricultural production, transport and fi nancial risk; 
and (3) instability in the world fi nancial system caused primarily by the unsustainable 
twin defi cits of the United States. The paper attempts a preliminary assessment of the 
likely economic implications of these risks for South Africa, and considers how the South 
African government could manage these risks through adaptive and mitigating policy 
adjustments. These recommendations are tentative, as the main aim of the paper is to 
introduce these issues for wider discussion and debate, and to motivate for more detailed 
research on their implications. 
The scope of the paper is broad, and therefore a certain amount of detail is sacrifi ced. This 
is not to suggest that details are inherently less valuable, but rather that a broad overview 
seems to be a good starting place for debate and discussion. In terms of international 
trade, this paper focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on trade in goods. The arguments 
may or may not apply to other aspects of trade, such as services and intellectual property. 
This selectivity is motivated by both tractability and relevance, inasmuch as physical 
resource limitations are a central pillar of the argument. The paper gives most attention 
to the issue of oil depletion, partly because this information is not widely appreciated, and 
also because it presents arguably the biggest medium- to long-term threat to international 
trade. Furthermore, as will be seen, the other risk factors – while important in their own 
right – are closely intertwined with energy issues. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the debate on 
the future of oil supply and prices, and considers their likely impact on global trade. 
Section 3 considers some of the implications of global warming and climate change for 
international trade and the world economy. Section 4 briefl y examines the precarious 
global macro-economy and fi nancial system, highlighting the unsustainability of the 
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United States’ twin defi cits. In section 5 the possible implications of these risks for the 
South African economy are elaborated. Section 6 considers policy response options for 
the South African government, and advocates mitigation strategies and policies designed 
to improve self-suffi ciency and protect the poor in sensitive areas, especially food and 
energy security. The fi nal section concludes by highlighting the interactive nature of 
the main risks, which is likely to compound the probability of their occurrence and the 
magnitude of their effects. 
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  2. The End of Cheap Oil
It is rare to encounter explicit admission that the current integrated global trading system 
is highly dependent on the relatively cheap availability of crude oil to fuel transportation 
networks (ships, automobiles and airplanes in particular). In fact, fossil fuel energy is 
arguably the key resource for the global industrial economy. Oil takes precedence as the 
most signifi cant energy source, although natural gas is assuming increasing importance, 
particularly as a source of electricity. As such, this section focuses on the issue of oil 
depletion, although the arguments do extend to natural gas and (to a lesser extent) to 
coal as well. 
Global demand for oil has been growing steadily for a century and a half, albeit with two 
hiccups in the 1970s. At the same time, the supply of oil has been depleting since the 
day the fi rst wells began pumping the black liquid in Pennsylvania in 1859.1 This simply 
follows from the fact that existing oil reserves were formed over many millions of years; 
consequently, from a human perspective oil has a fi nite supply. Ever since 1859, however, 
global oil production volume has trended upwards, and we have become accustomed to 
year after year of economic growth underpinned by the relatively cheap availability of oil. 
Extrapolating past trends, the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2004) forecasts average 
annual growth in oil demand of 1.6 per cent over the next 25 years, notably in the absence 
of major price movements or supply constraints.
1 Technically, depletion began in ancient times when crude oil was first used, but before 1859 the quantities involved   
 were insignificant. 
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Source: International Monetary Fund (2006) and Own Calculations
Note: The real oil price is the spot price defl ated by the US producer price index. 
With oil prices breaching the $70 per barrel mark in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 
September 2005, however, some economists began to warn of an oil price shock similar 
to those experienced in the 1970s (see Figure 1). It is therefore pertinent to ask why the 
oil price is so high at present, and whether the prospects are that the price will fall, remain 
relatively constant, or rise further in the foreseeable future. As will be seen, this issue has 
important implications for the world economy in general, and for international trade fl ows 
in particular. It should be noted, moreover, that historical oil prices have not refl ected 
either its true (long-term) scarcity, or its negative environmental externalities. The latter 
issue is taken up in section 3. 
Two main reasons are commonly given for the marked hike in the oil price in 2004-2005. 
The fi rst is rapidly growing demand, especially from developing economy giants such as 
China and India. Thirty per cent of world growth in oil demand in 2004 was attributable 
to China, and that country now ranks second behind the United States (US) amongst 
oil importers (Business Report, 2005). The US itself expanded its consumption of oil in 
2005 in defi ance of signifi cantly higher costs. This testifi es to the highly inelastic and 
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growing thirst for oil in industrial and industrialising economies, which has narrowed the 
gap between supply and demand. As of mid-2004 Saudi Arabia was the only nation with 
signifi cant spare (conventional) oil production capacity (IEA, 2004: 111), and even this 
gap now appears close to exhaustion. 
Secondly, some commentators in the media argue that the real reason for high oil prices 
at present is a lack of refi ning capacity rather than inadequate crude oil supplies. If this 
capacity were expanded, they say, there would be plenty of extra oil available. But if 
present and future crude oil supplies are plentiful, then why has refi ning capacity not been 
expanding in the past few years, or even decades? The common answer is that oil prices 
were too low to make such investments fi nancially attractive. However, it could also be 
because the major oil companies suspect that the days of plentiful oil are numbered. If 
this were to be true, it would be fi nancially unwise to invest massive sums in infrastructure 
which will soon fall idle. In any event, it is not clear why the lack of refi ning capacity 
would affect the price of unrefi ned crude oil to the extent claimed, as opposed to prices 
of refi ned oil products. 
This brings us to three pertinent questions. (1) How much oil remains to be produced? 
(2) How long is it likely to last? (3) What will happen to the price of oil over the coming 
years and decades? These questions are the subject of an intensifying debate between 
two main camps, which may be called the pessimists and the optimists. The former 
group is comprised mainly of petroleum geologists and ecologists who warn that we are 
approaching an imminent peak in global oil production, which jeopardises the future of 
industrial society as we know it. The optimistic side of the debate is populated mainly by 
economists, oil-industry lobbyists and offi cial government sources, such as the United 
States Department of Energy (DoE) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). They 
argue that production will increase for another two or more decades and consequently 
there is no cause for immediate concern. The following sections present an overview of 
this debate.
 
 2.1 ‘Proven’ Oil Reserves
According to the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO, 2005) some 
945 billion barrels of oil (Gbo) have been extracted from the Earth to date. This amount 
refers to ‘conventional’ or ‘light’ oil, which excludes ‘unconventional oils’ such as heavy 
oil, oil from tar sands, oil shale, and polar and deep water oil. More contentious is how 
much oil remains. Geologists distinguish between ‘resources’, hypothetical estimates of 
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all the oil existing in an area, and ‘reserves’, “the known quantity of oil that lies in fi elds 
and that can be produced with existing technologies, within a foreseeable time frame, at 
a commercially reasonable cost.” (Rifkin, 2002: 15). The key concept from an economic 
perspective is therefore reserves, which is a fl exible amount that varies with technological 
progress and economic conditions, especially the price of oil. 
Despite long-term rising production, so-called ‘proven’ oil reserves – offi cial estimates 
of ultimately recoverable supply – have been rising steadily for decades and currently 
stand at approximately 1,200 Gbo, according to various offi cial estimates (IEA, 2004). 
The upward trend is explained both by new discoveries and by the fact that historical 
reserves are frequently revised upward as new technologies allow more oil to be extracted 
from old wells. However, these reserve fi gures are aggregates of offi cial estimates from 
individual oil-producing countries, are not subject to independent audit, and are thus 
vulnerable to manipulation for political-economic reasons. At the heart of the debate on 
how much oil is left is a dispute over the reliability of offi cial proven reserves. Campbell 
and Laherrère (1998), for example, point out that most members of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel revised their proven reserves upward by 
anything between 30 and 200 per cent in the mid to late 1980s. This occurred shortly 
after the collapse in oil prices to around $10 per barrel in 1985, and OPEC’s decision 
that production quotas would henceforth be based on proven reserves. Cash-strapped 
countries that were highly dependent on oil revenues therefore had every incentive to 
infl ate their reserve estimates. Moreover, the fi gures published in periodicals such as 
World Oil and Oil & Gas Journal refl ect no change in reserve estimates from year to year 
for many countries, despite the fact that they were pumping oil and may or may not have 
been making any new discoveries (see IEA, 2004: 92-3). 
Furthermore, Matthew Simmons (2005), an independent energy consultant and former 
advisor to the Bush Administration, argues that Saudi Arabia’s offi cial oil reserves – 
amounting to about a quarter of the world total – are substantially over-estimated. He 
claims that the Saudis have been over-pumping their oil wells, which means that the 
fi nal gross quantity of oil that can be extracted will be signifi cantly less than previously 
estimated (for geological reasons). 
As a result of all these indeterminacies, geologists’ estimates of ultimately recoverable 
reserves vary from around 1,850 Gbo (ASPO, 2005) to some 3,003 Gbo (United States 
Geological Survey, USGS, ‘mean’ scenario). 
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The second key question posed above, namely how long will oil last, obviously depends 
on the extent of ultimately recoverable reserves, as well as rates of production and 
consumption. The conventional view (held by the optimists) rests on a formula called the 
reserve to production ratio (R/P), which – based on the offi cial reserve estimate of 1,200 
Gbo – is currently in the region of 40 years. The fact that this implies we have enough oil 
to last a little more than one generation at the current annual rate of production does not 
seem to perturb the optimists. However, this simplistic and unrealistic viewpoint suggests 
that oil production will remain fl at (at around 80 million barrels per day) for 40 years and 
then suddenly collapse to zero. Both geologically and economically, such a pattern of 
production would be impossible, for it says nothing about the way production from oil 
wells gradually declines, nor about how prices and demand will respond to diminishing 
supply. We turn now to a more realistic assessment of the evolution of oil production. 
 2.2 The ‘Hubbert Peak’ 
In the 1950s, a petroleum geologist named M. King Hubbert theorised that oil production 
in a given region would follow a bell curve, rising to a peak when approximately half of the 
total oil had been extracted, and thereafter gradually falling to zero. His theory was based 
on the observation that production from individual oil wells tends to rise to a plateau, 
remain relatively constant at a maximum rate for some time, and then decline fairly rapidly. 
Aggregating numerous such production profi les generates a rough bell curve, to which he 
applied a logistic probability distribution function for forecasting purposes. 
In 1956, Hubbert used his model to make the highly contentious prediction that oil 
production in the lower 48 United States (US/48) would peak some time between 1966 
and 1972 (Heinberg, 2003: 88). He turned out to be correct, the actual peak occurring in 
1970, after which date production has followed a declining trend. Hubbert hypothesised 
that world oil supply would follow a similar bell-shaped curve, mirroring the pattern of 
(earlier) oil discoveries. His theory has been the subject of intense debate, particularly 
in recent years. Increasingly, the debate centres more on when the peak in world oil 
production will occur, and less on whether it will occur. 
Since the late 1990s, a slew of books has been published on what is commonly called the 
‘peak oil’ phenomenon, including those by Campbell (1997), Youngquist (1997), Deffeyes 
(2001, 2005), Heinberg (2003, 2004), Goodstein (2005), Roberts (2005) and Leggett 
(2005). Journal articles on peak oil include those by Campbell and Laherrère (1998), 
Duncan and Youngquist (1999) and Duncan (2001, 2003). All of these authors assert 
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that oil production will follow some sort of Hubbert curve, and that the consequences of 
peaking for industrial civilisation will be very serious, if not calamitous. 
What is the evidence underpinning the Hubbert curve? First, in the US/48, which is the 
most intensively explored and drilled region on the planet, oil discoveries peaked in 
the 1930s, while production peaked in 1970. Global new oil discoveries peaked in the 
1960s and have been on a declining trend ever since. If the world curve follows the US 
pattern, this suggests a peak in world oil production this decade, about forty years after 
the discovery peak (Heinberg, 2004). According to Duncan (2003), more than half of 
the 44 signifi cant oil-producing nations have already passed their individual production 
peaks. Moreover, Heinberg (2004: 43) reports that “[s]ince 1981, the amount of new oil 
discovered each year has been less than the amount extracted and used.” At present, at 
least two barrels of oil are consumed for every one that is discovered. Simmons (2005) 
argues that Saudi Arabia – the country relied upon by the rest of the world for spare 
capacity – may soon peak itself, signalling a world peak. Figure 2 shows the historical 
patterns of conventional oil discoveries and actual production. Clearly, unless major new 
oil discoveries are made in the near future, production will begin to decline fairly soon. 
Figure 2: Historical Oil Discovery and Production
Source: ASPO (2005)
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It is important to clarify what is meant by ‘peak oil’. It does not mean the end of oil, since 
the peak (according to Hubbert’s theory) occurs when approximately half of the total oil 
supply has been extracted. What it means, rather, is the end of cheaply available oil, 
since the costs of extraction on the ‘far side of the hill’ will increase secularly while the 
supply declines. Moreover, demand (or desired oil) – which has been on a steadily rising 
trend along with population growth and economic expansion – will increasingly outstrip 
supply. As a consequence, the immediate implication of ‘peak oil’ is steadily rising prices 
of oil and its derivative products and services, along with increased volatility. Thus the 
third question posed above, i.e. what will happen to the oil price in the future, turns out to 
be the most important one in economic terms. 
It is already clear that world oil production is not following a smooth, bell-shaped Hubbert 
curve, but has rather exhibited a somewhat ‘bumpy plateau’ since the 1970s. This is due 
mainly to intentional supply limitations on the part of OPEC producers, and to complex 
supply-demand adjustments following the oil price shocks. This is what Hubbert himself 
failed to predict, and partially explains why his peak forecast for world oil production 
(somewhere in the 1990s) was premature (the other reason being the rate at which 
exploration and extraction technology has improved). With oil prices rising markedly and 
both demand and supply adjusting, we are most likely in for a bumpy ride in the short 
to medium term. Eventually, however, we will reach the other side of the plateau and 
– according to the peak oil fraternity – begin an inexorable decline. 
 2.3 Reserve Growth 
Ultimately recoverable reserves are an economic concept, and so “as oil starts to 
become scarce and the price per barrel goes up, the amount recoverable at that price will 
necessarily also increase” (Goodstein, 2004: 29). This also applies to non-conventional 
sources of oil such as tar sands and shale oil. There are two main sources of reserve 
growth: new discoveries and better extraction methods. 
Economists correctly point out that higher oil prices will stimulate increased exploration 
activity. However, more exploration does not automatically convert into signifi cant new 
discoveries: it depends on the extent to which undiscovered oil fi elds still exist. Again, 
opinions on this matter vary greatly, even among geologists. Colin Campbell thinks that 
most oil has already been found (Rifkin, 2002: 29), while the USGS is (again) optimistic 
about future fi nds. Similarly, the IEA (2004: 81) forecasts rising global production to 
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meet growing demand at least until 2030, “so long as necessary investments in supply 
infrastructure are made,” which they estimate will require a staggering $3 trillion. 
As mentioned previously and depicted in Figure 2, oil discoveries peaked in the 1960s, 
and have been especially low since 1990. Some argue that discoveries in the 1990s were 
low because oil was relatively cheap and hence exploration activity was unprofi table. But 
the price was also low (in both real and absolute terms) in the 1950s and 1960s when 
most of today’s known oil reserves were found. Furthermore, the oil price has been rising 
since 1999, and as yet there have only been a couple of substantial fi nds, in Kazakhstan 
and off Nigeria’s coast. Historically, while some 50,000 oil fi elds have been discovered, 
nearly half of all the oil found was contained in the forty largest oil fi elds (Goodstein, 
2004: 16). The chances of more mega-fi elds being discovered seem remote, since these 
are the ones which are generally found early on. The one major exception, on which the 
optimists’ hopes are apparently pinned, is that further mega-fi elds will be discovered in 
deep water, for example off the West coast of Africa. Encouragingly, ASPO’s (2005) latest 
projection contains a signifi cant upward revision of its previous estimate of deep water 
oil reserves, which pushes the peak for all liquids from 2007 to 2010. As ASPO (2005: 
12) notes, “[a]nyone familiar with this forecasting will know of the many uncertainties and 
diffi culties, but it seems best to advance step by step by reporting progress as it occurs, 
remembering always that it is subject to change.” 
Ultimately recoverable reserves may also grow as a result of improvements in drilling 
and extraction technologies. “The way the oil industry uses the term, the increase in 
recoverable oil counts as ‘discovery,’ and it accounts for much of the new discovery the 
USGS expects in the next thirty years” (Goodstein, 2004: 29). However, it should be 
noted that sophisticated technologies have been used since the 1970s, and yet the rate 
of ‘discoveries’ including backward revisions, as shown in Figure 2, has continued to 
decline. Nonetheless, Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA, 2005) recently 
produced a report on global oil supplies which claims that
“global oil production capacity is actually set to increase dramatically over 
the rest of this decade… As a result, supply could exceed demand by 
as much as 6 to 7.5 million barrels per day (mbd) later in the decade, a 
marked contrast to the razor-sharp balance between strong demand growth 
and tight supply that is currently refl ected in high oil prices hovering around 
$60 a barrel.”2 
2 See http://www.cera.com/news/details/1,2318,7453,00.html 
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One must not lose sight of the fact that the costs of extracting harder-to-access oil (e.g. 
deep water or heavy oils) are higher, and the higher price will have serious economic 
implications downstream. Moreover, the economic responses to higher prices – should 
they convert in practice into greater reserves – will act merely to delay the Hubbert peak, 
not to obviate it. Let us therefore consider the range of estimates regarding when the 
peak might occur. 
 2.4 When Might the Peak Occur? 
Due to disputes over the extent of ultimately recoverable reserves, estimates of the timing 
of the Hubbert peak vary considerably. At the pessimistic end of the scale, Deffeyes (2005) 
expected the peak to occur in late 2005, Duncan (2003) forecast 2006, while Campbell 
& Leherre’s (1998) early study put the peak date at before 2008. The Association for the 
Study of Peak Oil & Gas (ASPO), which is headed by Colin Campbell, publishes a revised 
estimate of the Hubbert curve every few months. According to its latest scenario (ASPO, 
2005), regular oil (which excludes heavy oil, shale oil, tar sands, deep water and polar oil, 
and natural gas liquids) peaked in 2004, while all liquids plus gas are projected to peak in 
2010 (see Figure 3). Most of those using the Hubbert methodology predict a peak some 
time between 2005 and 2016 (Heinberg, 2003). 
On the other side of the spectrum, the US Department of Energy’s ‘mean’ scenario says 
that oil will not peak until 2037. This assessment is based on the US Geological Survey’s 
(USGS) estimate of ultimately recoverable reserves being 3,003 billion barrels. However, 
the graph produced by their model (see Figure 4) shows the highly unlikely scenario of 
two per cent annual production growth until 2037 followed by a 10 per cent per annum 
depletion rate – an extremely steep cliff. Somewhat more realistically, although no less 
optimistic, CERA (2005) contend that the ‘infl exion point’, as they (incorrectly) call the 
peak, will not occur before 2020, and that there will be an undulating plateau for several 
decades hence, rather than a sharp peak. 
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Figure 3: ASPO’s Oil and Gas Depletion Scenario
Source: ASPO (2005)
Which geologist or organisation, one might ask, is most credible? Certainly, some of 
the difference of opinion may be explained by individuals’ propensity for optimism or 
pessimism. But it is also worth considering – as economists are wont to do – who has the 
biggest vested interest? Individual geologists such as Campbell or Deffeyes, as well as 
other peak oil pessimists, are in the vast minority, and considering that most people do 
not like bad news, their books are hardly best-sellers and they have put their reputations 
on the line in a generally hostile environment. On the other end of the spectrum, we 
have the US Government and the IEA, the latter being an agency of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and thus subject to political pressure. 
Suppose the Bush Administration actually believed that oil would peak within the next few 
years. Would they have wanted to publicise this information while attempting to convince 
American voters and foreign governments to support the war in Iraq on the basis of 
weapons of mass destruction? Or would they have wanted to obscure the looming oil 
crisis while at the same time taking military steps to ensure their future oil supply from the 
region which boasts 60 percent of the world’s remaining oil reserves? It should be borne 
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in mind that Vice President Dick Cheney was formerly the chief executive of Halliburton, 
the world’s largest oil service company, and hence had an inside track on oil prospects. 
As for consultancies, those with optimistic forecasts (such as CERA) could expect to 
obtain plenty of business from oil and automotive companies (inter alia) whose profi ts 
would be hurt by consumers switching to non-oil based products. 
Figure 4: US Energy Information Administration’s Annual Production Scenarios with 2% 
Growth Rates and Different Resource Levels (R/p = 10)
Source: Wood et al (2004)
In any event, after surveying many of the pessimistic and optimistic views on when oil 
production will peak, Heinberg (2004: 34) remarks that the “Age of Oil is indeed about to 
come to an end, by everyone’s estimates” (original italics). Ultimately, as Heinberg (2003) 
points out, the timing of the peak in world oil production will only be apparent several 
years after the fact, as there is likely to be considerable volatility in the years before and 
after the peak. The relevant questions are: what are the likely consequences and what 
can or should be done about it? 
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 2.5 Conservation and Alternative Energy Sources
Before turning to the likely consequences of the end of cheap oil, it is necessary to consider 
the potential of conservation measures and alternative energy sources to mitigate the 
impending shortfall in oil supply. There are two principal conservation strategies, namely 
increasing energy effi ciency and reducing consumption (see Heinberg, 2003: 160-164). 
The scope for both of these conservation measures is large – technically if not politically. 
For instance, energy consumption per capita in North America is twice that in Europe, 
due in no small part to Americans’ notorious preference for large vehicles as well as 
comparatively low taxes on gasoline. Some conservation measures include reduced 
road speed limits, encouragement of car-pools (e.g. through dedicated highway lanes), 
greater use of bicycles (especially in city centres), and mundane actions such as switching 
off lights and heating in unoccupied rooms and buildings. Greater energy effi ciency may 
be achieved through the use of more fuel-effi cient vehicles, better building insulation (in 
hot and cold climates), more effi cient lighting (e.g. Light Emitting Diodes and fl uorescent 
bulbs rather than incandescent bulbs), and smarter electric power plants and industrial 
processes (for instance using cogeneration techniques), to name but a few. Many of 
these measures may be appropriately incentivised by fi scal means. 
Increasing energy effi ciency over time in the US (and many other countries) is refl ected 
in the declining ratio of energy consumption to GDP. A fairly dramatic shift took place 
after the 1979 OPEC oil price shock, indicating that substantial conservation gains are 
possible, although much of these improvements were subsequently lost when the oil 
price declined. In any case, the long-term trend is partly due to the increasing use of high-
density energy sources, such as oil (relative, say, to coal). Heinberg (2003: 161) points 
out that “there are limits to the benefi ts from effi ciency, since increasing investments 
in energy effi ciency typically yield diminishing returns.” Furthermore, switching to new, 
more effi cient technologies involves indirect energy costs, for example as new machinery 
or goods are produced. 
Heinberg (2003) conducts a careful analysis of the potential of other energy sources 
(including natural gas, coal, nuclear, geothermal, hydroelectric, wind, solar power, biomass 
and tides) to compensate for declining oil. His prognosis is not comforting. Currently, no 
energy source is fully substitutable for oil, given this product’s high degree of versatility 
as both a fuel (especially for transport) and an input in the petrochemical industry, as 
well as its high energy density. Certainly, electricity can be produced by substitutes such 
as natural gas, coal and renewable energy sources. However, a transportation network 
of automobiles, aeroplanes and ships on anything like the present scale is simply not 
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feasible with existing energy technologies. Even heavy oil, tar sands and shale oil are 
not fully substitutable for conventional petroleum, as their costs of extraction are much 
higher and their energy return on energy invested (EROEI) is much lower. They are also 
far more destructive to the environment. 
Nonrenewable energy sources are by defi nition not a long-term proposition. In the 
medium term, however, they may assist a shift to renewable sources. Natural gas is 
also a highly versatile and effi cient energy source, but its production may peak in about 
20 years’ time, which has massive implications for heating, agriculture and electricity 
generation in its own right (see Darley, 2005). Coal is highly polluting and not perfectly 
substitutable for oil; nevertheless, it will almost certainly be used more intensively in the 
future. Nuclear power is extremely costly up front, and as yet no solution to toxic waste 
has been found. Nevertheless, nuclear power plants may become more fashionable as oil 
prices rise, but it will take “at best a decade or more for the new power plants to come on 
line” (Goodstein, 2004: 19). Geothermal power, some of which is renewable, has limited 
geographical availability and relatively low energy potential. 
The renewable sources of wind, hydro and solar have much potential for electricity 
generation and are generally clean. However, they all come with some costs, and together 
they are unlikely to be able to support the current scale and kind of socio-economic 
structure enjoyed by industrial societies, especially in terms of transport. Biomass is 
highly polluting and contributes to deforestation if used on a large scale. Biodiesel and 
ethanol show some promise, but their use will be constrained by available arable land 
and competition for food production. Finally, hydrogen is an energy carrier, not a primary 
source, and would require a very different infrastructure and thus be expensive to adopt 
(Heinberg, 2003). 
Clearly, technological improvements are an unpredictable wildcard; it is conceivable that 
major strides will be made within a short time period when the incentives are adequately 
strong (i.e. when the price of fossil fuels is suffi ciently high). But relying on possible short-
term technological fi xes on a large scale seems imprudent at best and wishful thinking at 
worst. Heinberg (2003: 164-65) summarises the situation thus: 
“[i]f there is any solution to industrial societies’ approaching energy crisis, 
renewables plus conservation will provide it. Yet in order to achieve a 
transition from nonrenewables to renewables, decades will be required – 
and we do not have decades before the peaks in the extraction rates of oil 
and natural gas occur… the transition will necessarily be comprehensive: it 
will entail an almost complete redesign of industrial societies.” 
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 2.6 Likely Consequences of ‘Peak Oil’ for International Trade
While the economic impacts of peaking oil production are likely to be wide-ranging 
and deep, the focus of the present paper is on implications for international trade. The 
following subsections outline some possible consequences of the looming energy crisis 
fi rst for global economic prospects, and then for three key sectors – transport, agriculture 
and manufacturing.  The penultimate subsection summarises the possible effects on the 
structure of international trade. This is followed by a discussion of geopolitical risks related 
to oil depletion and how they may impact on trade. The analysis is necessarily tentative, 
and one of the main points this paper attempts to make is that much more attention needs 
to be invested in assessing the economic (and social) implications of oil depletion. 
2.6.1 Global Economic Prospects
A steadily rising oil price will – as in the past – most likely create infl ationary pressures 
across the globe and put a brake on economic growth. According to ABSA (2004: 1), 
“a $10 per barrel increase in the price of oil will, over the course of a full year, raise the 
global infl ation rate by about 0.5% and dampen economic growth by roughly 1%.” At least 
in the near term, whether or not higher oil prices cause an outright recession depends to 
a large degree on the monetary policy response by central banks. If central banks allow 
the higher energy prices to work through the system, then the increasing scarcity of fossil 
fuels will manifest appropriately in altered relative prices. A rise in energy prices would 
most likely be a stimulus to investment in both fossil fuel energy (e.g. greater exploration 
for new oil and gas fi elds) and renewable energy sources. In the short- to medium-term 
this investment could serve to boost aggregate demand and therefore economic growth 
(or at least ameliorate any output decline). 
Much depends on how sustained the oil price rises are, and how quickly they rise. If 
energy prices rise steeply, central banks may have no option but to counter infl ationary 
pressures, as hyperinfl ation would possibly be a greater evil than recession. If central 
banks around the world raise interest rates sharply, this may induce an international 
recession (as occurred in the early 1980s). Consumers will already be curbing spending 
as a result of higher energy prices (and second-round price increases for energy-intensive 
goods and services), and if this demand reduction is exacerbated by higher interest rates, 
which also depress investment, the economic situation could deteriorate rapidly. Indeed, 
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (2004) show that the two economic recessions in the US 
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following the oil shocks in the 1970s were more the result of contractionary monetary 
policy than of the oil price increases themselves. 
In the longer term, mainstream economists would tend to argue that the price mechanism 
will ensure a relatively painless transition to fossil fuel substitutes if and when oil becomes 
suffi ciently scarce. Therefore, they would not advocate policies to wean countries off 
fossil fuels (e.g. by subsidising renewable energy sources), but rather rely on the market 
mechanism. “But as we learned in 1973,” writes Goodstein (2005: 18), “the effects of an 
oil shortage can be immediate and drastic, while it may take years, perhaps decades, 
to replace the vast infrastructure that supports the manufacture, distribution, and 
consumption [of oil]”. 
We have some experience of the effects of supply-driven oil price shocks, especially 
those in 1973 and 1979, which resulted in worldwide economic recessions. What will be 
different after the peak in oil production is passed is that the price will never retreat to 
earlier levels, as it did previously. In other words, on the down-slope of the Hubbert curve 
the world faces an endless sequence of supply-side oil shocks. The US Department of 
Energy commissioned a report on the peak oil situation by Hirsch et al (2005: 4), who 
conclude that:
“The peaking of world oil production presents the US and the world with an 
unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached, liquid 
fuel prices and price volatility will increase dramatically, and, without timely 
mitigation, the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented. 
Viable mitigation options exist on both the supply and demand sides, but 
to have substantial impact, they must be initiated more than a decade in 
advance of peaking.” 
Leggett (2005) argues that the crucial timing is not the actual date of the oil peak, but rather 
when a critical mass of investors wakes up to the inevitability of the peak (admittedly this 
may only occur in retrospect). This realisation is likely to spark wide-spread panic among 
investors, with potentially devastating effects on fi nancial markets and consequently on 
the global economy. The oil market itself has demonstrated time and again how sensitive 
prices are to news of small interruptions to supply, particularly in recent years. No wonder 
the giant oil companies maintain that oil supplies are not in jeopardy; their shares would 
otherwise be far less attractive. 
Having considered the big picture, let us now consider some sectoral impacts of peak 
oil. 
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2.6.2 Transport
The sector that will be most immediately and most obviously affected by oil shortages is 
the transport sector, which will experience rising costs over the long term and increased 
volatility in the short term due to various economic adjustments. Clearly, this sector is 
critical to the international goods trade. As mentioned in the introduction, the rapid growth 
in goods trade over the past few decades has been fuelled by cheap oil. Rising oil prices 
will make long-distance trade relatively less competitive than local trade. Shipping, truck 
and diesel locomotive freight will be most directly affected by rising oil prices, but even 
electrically powered freight trains will suffer since all energy prices are likely to rise as 
less net energy is available. Uncertainty arising from oil price volatility is likely to put an 
additional brake on international trade fl ows as it will raise the risks faced by importers 
and exporters. 
2.6.3 Agriculture
Just as for energy, growth in the world population and per capita incomes are raising the 
demand for food. The population growth rate has recently begun to decline, but annually 
some 80 million people are still added to the world population. China and India’s rapid 
industrialisation means that their populations are gradually moving up the food chain, 
increasingly demanding more resource-intensive items beyond traditional staples such 
as rice and wheat. 
On the supply side, global food production per capita has been rising since the industrial 
revolution began, and especially since the so-called ‘green revolution’ of the 1960s when 
chemical fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides began to be used extensively in developing 
countries. Figure 5 shows how world grain yields have increased over the past half 
century in tandem with key inputs (e.g. use of fertilizers and tractors). The upward trends 
are broadly consistent with the trend in oil production. The levelling off of tractor and 
fertilizer use since about 1990 may refl ect technological improvements (such as larger 
tractors and higher nitrogen content, respectively) or perhaps a slowing rate of expansion 
of arable land. 
Commercial agriculture, particularly in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, is highly mechanised and therefore dependent on crude 
oil or a substitute liquid fuel. Moreover, fertilizers and pesticides are produced from oil 
and natural gas, and so diminishing supplies of these fossil fuels will result in falling 
yields. Global meat and fi sh production per capita have also been rising steadily since 
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1960. As with grains, however, these foodstuffs are also partially dependent on fossil 
fuels, especially oil, since livestock and aquaculture require feed (which is grown using 
fertilizers, etc.) and the marine fi shing fl eet relies on oil for fuel. We can thus expect 
signifi cantly falling agricultural production and rising food prices after oil production peaks 
(see Heinberg, 2005). Currently, only a handful of countries (including the US, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) are signifi cant net food exporters. Their exportable surplus 
will shrink at the same time as importing countries will require even more produce from 
abroad. On the other hand, the shifting terms of trade in favour of agricultural products 
may in fact benefi t small-scale producers in developing countries who do not rely heavily 
on oil, and food exporting countries in general. However, rising transport costs will add 
to food price increases and reduce the overall volume of international agricultural trade. 
This will bring serious food security concerns, especially for food-importing countries. 
Even food-exporting countries will need to be prudent about how much they export, and 
the diversity of their agricultural production. 
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2.6.4 Manufacturing
The volume of manufacturing production will also be affected by rising oil prices. 
Goodstein (2004: 15) writes that “ninety percent of the organic chemicals we use – 
pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals, plastics – are made from petroleum”. The list of 
everyday consumables that rely on plastics is astounding: according to Bell (2005: 17), 
“[n]inety percent of the past holiday season’s gifts [in the US] contained plastic material in 
some form or the other, right from dolls, toys, bicycles, helmets, DVDs, CDs and games, 
to packaging material used for wrapping gifts, like cellophane, plastic wires and plastic 
peanuts.” The list of items including plastic components can be extended indefi nitely, and 
include such important ones as computers and automobiles. The petrochemicals industry 
will clearly be hard hit by declining oil volumes and rising prices. Moreover, factories are 
overwhelmingly powered by electricity, but most of this electricity is produced from fossil 
fuels. North America in particular is highly dependent on natural gas (and to a lesser 
extent oil) for electricity generation. 
2.6.5 Restructuring International Trade
In all of these sectors, then, declining oil supply will most likely lead to falling production 
levels and rising prices. As a result, the aggregate volume of international trade fl ows is 
likely to decline signifi cantly as demand drops, although the effects on trade revenues will 
depend on elasticities. If peaking oil production triggers economic recession, as seems 
likely, this will further reduce trade fl ows. 
Furthermore, we can expect shifts in the terms of trade and in sectoral patterns of trade. 
In general, all energy-intensive production and services will increase in price but decrease 
in volume relative to non-energy-intensive activities. Labour-intensive sectors will benefi t 
while capital-intensive sectors will decline. Primary commodities (especially agricultural 
products, but other resources as well) are likely to become relatively more expensive. 
International (as well as domestic) tourism will be less attractive and affordable as air 
fares and other travel costs mount. The airline and automobile industries are already 
experiencing serious fi nancial diffi culties, at least in the United States (for example, both 
General Motors and Ford reported losses of over $1 billion in 2005, while several airlines 
have fi led for bankruptcy). Some sectors will no doubt benefi t from the rising energy 
costs. In particular, telecommunications is likely to receive a boost as physical commuting 
is curtailed. Similarly, intra-industry trade will make less and less economic sense (it is 
doubtful whether it ever made ecological sense, if one factors in externalities such as 
greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of pollution). 
Risks to Global Trade and Implications for South Africa’s Economy and Policy
              21 
Perhaps most signifi cantly, the down-slope of the oil curve may in the medium to long 
term force the globalisation process – at least in terms of goods trade – to reverse. 
Increasingly, local production and consumption will become more competitive relative 
to the current highly globalised system of trade. Although sacrifi cing effi ciency – at least 
as conventionally measured, i.e. ignoring environmental and social externalities – such 
a move toward localisation could bring substantial socio-economic benefi ts to many 
regions, especially poorer ones. It could, for example, encourage more labour-intensive 
local production, thereby helping to reduce unemployment rates, inequality and poverty. 
However, a positive outcome depends critically on whether production patterns can 
respond in a context of energy scarcity and possible recession. 
2.6.6 Geopolitical Risks
The continued globalisation of trade is also threatened by geopolitical risks related to oil. 
Competition over dwindling energy and food resources looks set to increase dramatically 
in the years ahead, with the US and China in particular appearing to be on a collision 
course. This may well precipitate trade wars in the future. More seriously, in a worst-
case scenario – which Heinberg (2004) for one sees as the most likely outcome – the 
occurrence of military wars over resources may rise. The path taken by the US, as the 
world’s military and economic superpower, will affect the entire globe. US foreign policy 
under the Bush Administration has been stridently unilateralist, evidenced most clearly 
by its invasion of Iraq without United Nations approval. Engdahl (2004) makes the case 
that not just the latest Iraq war, but also the First and Second World Wars, were fought 
– at least in part – over access to oil reserves. ABSA (2004: 4) states that the “Iraqi war 
may be the fi rst of a series of confl icts over global oil resources.” It goes without saying 
that wars will disrupt trade, to an extent which depends on their geographical coverage, 
but especially if they involve disruptions to oil supply. 
It is also reasonable to expect an increase in international terrorist activity in the future. As 
long as the US-led coalition retains its forces in Iraq, it will continue to foment geopolitical 
tensions. With over 60 per cent of the world’s offi cially remaining oil and gas reserves, 
the Middle East will most likely see a rising amount of foreign interest and involvement 
by major energy-importing nations. Partly as a result, radical Islamisation is on the rise, 
with Iran in the vanguard, and this poses a huge threat to oil-dependent Western nations 
(see Rifkin, 2002). According to ABSA (2004: 2), “[i]n Saudi Arabia, terrorist attacks on 
oil installations have highlighted the intentions of Al-Qaeda to disrupt oil exports from 
that country, raise oil prices and thereby damage the economic interests of the industrial 
countries.” Britain, at least, appears to be taking this threat seriously. A recent report 
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entitled “Britain’s Energy Future: Securing the Home Front” (Plesch, Austin & Grant, 
2005) has garnered support from the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott. The report 
recommends ‘energy wardens’ to police conservation measures in a bid to reduce Britain’s 
dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. 
As Roubini (2005: 1) argues, “terrorism is an important geostrategic risk that affects the 
global economy and fi nancial markets.” For instance, following the London terror attacks 
on 7 July 2005, stock markets and currencies of geopolitically vulnerable countries such 
as the UK and US took a knock. As Roubini (2005: 1) puts it, “[t]hese market reactions are 
also consistent with the expected economic impacts of terrorism: by reducing confi dence 
and increasing the risk aversion of consumers and fi rms, terrorism also leads to lower 
consumption and lower real investments; it can thus trigger an economic slowdown if not 
an outright recession.” This perspective is borne out in reality in the effects of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in New York, since the resulting “loss of confi dence had an adverse self-
reinforcing effect on growth in the United States and Europe” (Brück & Wickström, 2004: 
3-4, citing Baily, 2001). 
In addition to such broad economic repercussions, terrorism has already impacted 
directly on trade through its effects on the airline and tourism industries. For example, 
many airlines around the world have experienced fi nancial problems following the 9/11 
attacks. This is mainly attributable to a sharp rise in risk aversion amongst potential 
travellers. Another way terrorism might affect trade is through heightened security threats 
at key infrastructure terminals, especially ports and airports. This will become even more 
of a concern if and when natural gas shipments increase to substitute for declining oil 
supplies, since gas is inherently less stable and hence more vulnerable to bombs. More 
generally, Brück and Wickström (2004) note that the policy responses to terror attacks 
raise transaction costs for international (and domestic) trade. One study, by Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004), fi nds that “a doubling of terror incidents reduces bilateral trade by 
4 per cent” (Brück & Wickström, 2004: 6). Roubini (2005: 3) goes as far as to say that 
“[t]errorism could have long-term consequences if it leads to a slow-down or reversal of 
globalisation.” 
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  3 Climate Change
A second category of risks to global trade, also within the realm of environment and 
resources, are those posed by global warming and climate change. The great majority 
of climate scientists agree that the Earth is warming and that much of this warming is 
human-induced through the burning of fossil fuels (see IPCC, 2001). The evidence of 
global warming is mounting day by day: icecaps and glaciers are melting (e.g. the Artic 
sea ice has shrunk considerably and in summer no longer covers the North Pole), and air 
and sea temperatures are rising. The effects of global warming on the Earth’s climate are 
already evident, manifesting in increasing prevalence and severity of extreme weather 
conditions, such as heat waves, droughts, fl oods and storms. In addition, there is already 
evidence of rising sea levels owing to the melting of icecaps and glaciers as well as 
thermal expansion of the oceans. 
The subject of climate change is vast, and its potential economic impacts are complex, 
wide-ranging and uncertain. Nevertheless, some speculations as to possible impacts of 
climate change on the world economy and international trade are offered below. Three 
especially vulnerable areas are focused upon, namely agriculture, transport infrastructure 
and fi nancial risk. Thereafter, the important relationship between peak oil and climate 
change is explored. 
 3.1 Agriculture
Agriculture is one of the sectors most vulnerable to climate change. Although some regions 
(especially cooler areas such as northern Canada, Europe and Asia) may actually benefi t 
from climate change in terms of agricultural productivity, Brown (2003: 62) states that on 
balance climate change is expected to reduce crop yields on a global scale. Indeed, some 
crops – including maize – are highly vulnerable to small changes in average temperatures. 
Less stable and more extreme weather means greater susceptibility to droughts and 
fl oods, as well as greater uncertainty inhibiting agricultural investment. Furthermore, the 
melting of glaciers threatens stable water supplies for agriculture (as well as industry 
and private consumption) in some areas. In addition, rising sea levels may compromise 
agricultural production in some critical regions, such as low-lying southern Bangladesh, 
which produces about half of that country’s rice (Brown, 2001: 36). Some regions are 
already experiencing worsening droughts, such as Southern Africa, the Sahel in North 
Africa and northwest China. 
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Global warming also threatens fi sh stocks. It is already widely known that coral reefs, 
which support an abundance of fi sh species, are dying off due to rising sea temperatures. 
Potentially even more concerning is the discovery that carbon dioxide is dissolving in the 
oceans at an increasing rate, thereby raising their acidity level. This may threaten the 
existence of zooplankton, the basis of the entire marine food chain (Leggett, 2005: 121). 
Overall, climate change increases vulnerability and threatens water and food security in 
many regions. This in turn raises the risk of confl ict. Thus, as far as international trade 
and agricultural production are concerned, climate change is likely to exacerbate the 
effects of oil depletion as discussed in the preceding sections. 
 3.2 Transport Infrastructure
Climate change also has negative implications for the transport infrastructure supporting 
international trade, for at least two reasons. First, the increasingly destructive power 
of storms threatens both shipping activity as well as energy supplies. The latter issue 
was highlighted in 2005 by the effects of hurricanes Katrina and Rita on oil production 
and refi ning facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, and consequently on oil prices. According to 
Emanuel (2005), hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico have increased markedly in duration 
and intensity over the past thirty years, just as measured surface sea temperatures have 
risen as a result of global warming. Weather disruptions such as these would also tend 
to increase uncertainty surrounding trade logistics and the economic costs associated 
with this. 
Second, in the longer term rising sea levels may threaten port infrastructure around the 
world, particularly in low-lying areas such as Western Europe and the Eastern United 
States. It has been estimated that if either the Greenland icecap or the West Antarctic 
ice sheet were to melt completely, the average sea level would rise by approximately 
seven or fi ve metres, respectively (Leggett, 2005: 119-120). Recent evidence confi rms 
that both of these melting processes are well under way and are speeding up, greatly 
exceeding the IPCC’s (2001) projections on the timeframe of sea level rise (see Hansen, 
2006; Velicogna & Wahr, 2006). At the very least, these effects are likely to raise the 
costs of shipping and thereby curtail long-distance trade. In the worst case, entire coastal 
cities may be inundated, forcing mass evacuations to higher-lying areas and vast new 
infrastructure to be built. 
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 3.3 Financial Risk
A third economic consequence of climate change, namely increasing fi nancial risk, is 
perhaps the primary concern as regards the health and stability of the world economy and 
trading system. According to Leggett (2005: 106), the global insurance industry maintains 
a reserve for natural catastrophes in the region of $300 billion annually, which “could in 
principle be wiped out overnight.” Losses to the insurance industry from natural disasters, 
many related to global warming, have been growing by about 10 per cent per annum 
since the 1970s. Mounting losses – or a particularly severe catastrophe – could bankrupt 
the insurance industry and lead to systemic capital market collapse.  The two biggest 
reinsurance companies in the world, Swiss Re and Deutsche Re, are keenly aware of 
the threat posed by climate change. However, to date their warnings have not had much 
impact on governments, the fi nancial sector or oil companies. 
Global warming also has more specifi c and localised consequences for fi nancial risk. 
Destruction caused by storms means that resources have to be diverted away from 
new investment or consumption to reconstruction efforts. This has the potential to 
retard economic growth and trade, and place increasing fi nancial burdens on individual 
governments. For example, a US Congressional team estimated the costs of rebuilding 
New Orleans after the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina to be in the order of 
$150 billion, which represents nearly one third of the US budget defi cit and one fi fth of its 
trade defi cit in 2004. Hurricanes Rita and Wilma each caused losses estimated at around 
$10 billion (Independent Newspapers, 2005). Such huge costs will place an increasing 
burden on the US’s twin defi cits, the subject of section 4 (see Riedl, 2005). 
 3.4 Carbon Emissions, Fossil Fuel Depletion and Climate Change
The interaction between carbon dioxide emissions, fossil fuel depletion and global warming 
is both complex and important. This section considers three key, related questions. 
First, will emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol be suffi cient to avert catastrophic 
climate change, and will they constrain economic activity and trade?  Climate change has 
become an increasingly prominent issue in the mainstream political and policy discourses 
(although it has yet to make serious inroads into the economics arena). For instance, 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair has recently championed climate change mitigation, 
most visibly in his chairmanship of the G8 countries in 2005. The Kyoto Protocol’s target 
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of a 6 per cent reduction in 1990 emission levels by 2012 is extremely modest in relation 
to the scale of the problem (which requires at least 60 per cent reductions, according 
to the IPCC). Moreover, the US – by far the greatest source of carbon emissions – has 
thus far refused to ratify the agreement. Neither has the Protocol been signed by the 
rapidly developing Asian giants, China and India. If signifi cant CO
2
 emission reductions 
do materialise in the future, this will almost certainly constrain economic activity in 
industrialised countries and thereby reduce the amount of foreign trade. On the other 
hand, the South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (2004: iv) 
notes that, “[a]ccording to the IPCC Third Assessment Report, climate change is already 
happening, and will continue to happen even if global greenhouse gas emissions are 
curtailed signifi cantly in the short to medium term.” 
The second question is whether fossil fuel depletion – and specifi cally an imminent peak 
in oil production – implies that concerns about future carbon emissions are unwarranted? 
The IPCC’s (2001) long-term climate change forecasts assume continued fossil-fuel 
based economic growth and rising carbon emissions. If indeed the peak of oil (and 
gas) production turns out to occur in just a few years’ time, this might seem to imply 
that greenhouse gas emissions will decrease irrespective of mitigation policies such 
as voluntary emission reductions or those agreed to under the Kyoto Protocol. On the 
other hand, however, oil depletion raises the spectre of a substitution of coal for oil and 
gas, especially in the US, China and India, each of which have abundant coal reserves. 
Increasing reliance on coal, which produces more CO
2
 per energy unit than oil and gas, 
may mean increasing net emissions in the future and faster planetary warming. 
The third question follows from the previous one: can we afford to burn all the remaining 
fossil fuels? In Leggett’s (2005: 117) view, “we have plenty [fossil fuels left] to tip us into 
global economic ruin as a result of climatic meltdown.” Consequently, he argues, “we 
cannot afford to burn all the oil [that remains], much of the gas must remain below ground, 
and the great majority of the coal shouldn’t even be considered” (p. 128).  
It may be that the process of global warming already has suffi cient momentum such 
that possible reductions (whether voluntary or involuntary) will not substantially curb its 
effects. Climate scientists are increasingly preoccupied with so-called ‘tipping points’, 
thresholds of irreversibility and acceleration in the warming process. Leggett (2005: 119-
120) identifi es several “sleeping giants”, including: methane hydrate destabilisation; the 
land biosphere switching from a sink to a source of carbon; the Atlantic Gulf stream shutting 
down; and the melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and the Arctic ice cap. If 
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any one or some combination of these giants were to awaken, as seems to be happening, 
the global climate may undergo abrupt changes with far-reaching consequences. 
Clearly, climate change and its effects are fraught with uncertainty, and yet the enormity of 
the issue is becoming increasingly apparent. This suggests that more attention needs to 
be given to assessing its possible economic effects and the range of potential adaptation 
and mitigation strategies that can be adopted. Some such options will be discussed in 
section 6, but before then we consider a third major risk to world trade, namely global 
monetary imbalances. 
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  4. Global Monetary Imbalances
Accounting for nearly a quarter of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the US 
economy – which is dominated by consumption spending – drives world growth. In recent 
years, the sustainability of the US’s massive and growing twin defi cits (i.e. its budget 
and current account defi cits) has become an increasing source of concern amongst 
macroeconomists.3 The Federal budget, which was in surplus by the end of the Clinton 
Administration, has been negative and growing since 2001. The two main reasons for the 
expanding fi scal defi cit are President Bush’s huge tax cuts, and the costs of fi nancing the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ‘war on terror’. 
The current account defi cit, on the other hand, has been growing since the early 1990s, 
and reached a massive $660 billion (5.7 per cent of GDP) in 2004 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 
2005). Two-thirds of this amount was effectively fi nanced through loans provided by the 
world’s central banks at low interest rates (Roubini & Setser, 2005: 2). China, Japan 
and other Asian countries are increasing dollar and US Treasury holdings so that they 
can continue to export large volumes of goods to the US. Meanwhile, OPEC countries 
are stockpiling dollars – and increasingly euros – received from their windfall oil exports. 
And Europe is helping to prop up the dollar so as not to lose too many jobs. The system 
whereby Asian countries peg their currencies to the US dollar and effectively fi nance 
American consumers has been referred to as ‘Bretton Woods II’ (Roubini & Setser, 
2005: 2). 
Given the artifi cially low value of Asian currencies in this Bretton Woods II system, there 
is a risk of increasing protectionist backlashes in OECD countries (especially the US and 
EU) to cheap Asian imports, most especially from China. Both the US and EU already 
impose quota restrictions on Chinese clothing and textile imports. Roubini and Setser 
(2005: 14) argue that “the US politically cannot allow its manufacturing base to decline as 
sharply as a sustained Bretton Woods II system would imply, particularly since Chinese 
production is moving up the value-added chain.” American and European voters’ jobs are 
in increasing jeopardy, and rising unemployment and casualisation of work opportunities 
3 This concern is evidenced in the number of papers being written on this topic and circulated on the Internet, as well   
 as attention in the weblogs of some prominent macroeconomists, which are too numerous to list here. Many of the   
 papers have been written recently and have yet to appear in published journals. See, for example, Obstfeld and   
 Rogoff (2005), Roubini and Setser (2005), and papers available at: http://currentaccount.lafollette.wisc.edu/
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is eroding living standards at the lower end of the income distribution in many OECD 
countries. 
Added to the twin defi cit problems in the US are immense levels of private and national 
debt, and signs of a possible housing market bubble. The private savings rate is extremely 
low, and many American households have taken advantage of historically low interest 
rates to re-mortgage their houses in order to fi nance current expenditure. 
If indeed the US economy is on an unsustainable path, an important question is what 
events could trigger a correction? Four main risk factors can be identifi ed, two of which 
emanate from within the US itself, while the other two are international in nature. First, US 
interest rates have been rising steadily over the past two years, and if this trend continues 
– which seems likely given infl ationary pressures from high oil prices – it may at some 
point burst the property bubble and cause a debt crunch for consumers. This would lead 
to a substantial drop in demand. Second, rising costs associated with natural disasters 
are placing increasing strain on the Federal (and State) budgets. As mentioned earlier, 
estimates of the costs resulting from the three hurricanes that hit Florida in 2005 run into 
the tens – if not hundreds – of billions of dollars. As global warming intensifi es, the risk of 
more such events rises. 
Third, there is an increasing risk of a collapse in confi dence in the dollar as international 
reserve currency. At some point, countries like China, Japan and South Korea may decide 
that the exposure risks of continuing to support the dollar outweigh the benefi ts in terms 
of boosting their exports, in which case they would limit their purchases of US Treasuries 
(Roubini & Setser, 2005). Roubini and Setser (2005: 3) argue that “the current renminbi-
dollar standard is not sustainable: the scale of the fi nancing required to sustain the US 
current account defi cits is increasing faster than the willingness of the world’s central 
banks to continue to build up their dollar reserves” and that “there is a meaningful risk 
the Bretton Woods II system will unravel before the end of 2006.” A similar situation faces 
the European Central Bank, although in this case political considerations are probably 
as important as economic ones: Europeans are growing weary of indirectly fi nancing 
America’s war in Iraq and US citizens’ excessive consumption. Moreover, certain 
signifi cant oil producing nations (including some OPEC nations and Russia) may decide 
to switch the denomination of their oil exports to Euros. Iran is probably one of the most 
likely suspects in this regard, given its mutually hostile relationship with the US. 
Fourth, rising oil prices are putting additional strain on the US’s trade balance, since 
the majority of their oil consumption is imported. Even if the US economy manages 
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to keep going for several years, it will eventually encounter the effects of peaking oil 
production, which, as we saw earlier, may occur as soon as 2010. That event is likely 
to be the fi nal straw for both consumers and the government. While there is signifi cant 
potential for energy savings, the US Government is clearly not (yet) following a policy of 
energy conservation. The neo-conservative Bush Administration has instead opted to 
use its military to ensure continued access to oil resources, most obviously in the Middle 
East. The costs of maintaining this military presence may rise in the future as imported 
sources of oil become increasingly important; this will compound the US current account 
imbalance. 
All in all, the weight of evidence suggests that the US economy is on an unsustainable 
trajectory. The landing, when it comes, may be ‘soft’ and drawn out, but the more time 
elapses and the greater the defi cits and debts become, the higher the likelihood of a sharp 
adjustment and overshooting. What would be the implications of a hard landing? One 
immediate result would clearly be a signifi cant devaluation of the dollar and a consequent 
fall in US imports. Given that the US is the world’s foremost importer by far, this would 
hurt many exporting countries, especially those in East Asia. More seriously, if there is a 
collapse of property and consequently equity prices in the US, this would lead to curtailed 
investment and economic recession. It is not inconceivable that such a slump in the US 
would induce a worldwide recession. Given the dollar’s status as international reserve 
currency, this might in turn cause a world-wide systemic fi nancial crisis and possibly even 
another Great Depression. 
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  5. Economic and Social Implications for South Africa
We now turn to consider the implications of the risks to global trade for South Africa, 
based on this country’s socio-economic profi le. The discussion is again tentative due 
to the complexity and uncertainty of the situation. At the very least, the likelihood of 
some very serious negative outcomes seems high enough to warrant more detailed 
and rigorous investigation and debate. Of particular concern is the impact on the poor, 
who are likely to suffer far more than their more well-off compatriots. While the potential 
implications of the risks are very diverse, this section focuses on fi ve important socio-
economic spheres, namely trade, other macroeconomic effects, energy and food security, 
and social stability. 
 5.1 Trade
The main consequences for international trade of the risks identifi ed in the preceding 
three sections may be summarised as follows: higher transport costs, lower agricultural 
and manufacturing production, and reduced overall demand following the global 
peak in oil production; increased transaction costs and uncertainty due to the effects 
of climate change; a reduction in world demand for exports as a result of US current 
account rebalancing; higher transaction costs because of terrorist threats; and increased 
protectionism in response to both geopolitical tensions and economic fallout from the other 
factors. Together, these factors are likely to reduce the overall volume of international 
trade, and also to alter the sectoral composition and terms of trade. The impact of these 
two effects on South Africa will be discussed in turn. 
In common with many other developing countries, export orientation is a key aspect of 
South Africa’s growth strategy. Exports in 2004 comprised 26.6 per cent of GDP (SARB, 
2005). A signifi cant reduction in global trade therefore puts an export-led development 
path potentially at risk. In general, South Africa will have to become more self-suffi cient 
in a range of sectors if or when international trade becomes relatively more expensive. 
Higher transport and other transaction costs will tilt the balance between tradeable and 
nontradeable sectors in favour of the latter. This is especially true for South Africa given its 
considerable distance from its main trading partners (Europe, the US, the United Kingdom 
and Japan). Trade with more proximate countries will also suffer, however, given the high 
costs of land-based freight transport, especially in Africa. On the plus side, more costly 
international trade presents South Africa with signifi cant import substitution opportunities. 
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This applies across the board where the costs of international trade rise, but is especially 
pronounced in certain sectors where South Africa has comparative advantage. 
As far as sectoral impacts are concerned, as mentioned in section 2 peaking oil production 
is likely to shift the terms of trade in favour of primary commodities (e.g. minerals and 
agricultural products). In periods of economic downturn and infl ation, resources such as 
gold and other minerals tend to do well, and South Africa is clearly well placed in this 
regard. This resource endowment buffered the South African economy to some extent 
from the 1970s oil shocks. However, minerals today comprise a much smaller portion of 
both exports and GDP and South Africa’s economy is considerably more open than was 
the case in the 1970s. Nonetheless, South Africa is presently the world’s third-largest 
coal exporter and has the seventh largest coal reserves in the world. Much of these coal 
exports go to Europe, while some are destined for neighbouring countries in Southern 
Africa. The coal and uranium mining and electricity generation sectors are likely to benefi t 
from higher energy prices in the future, and will to some extent balance the effects of 
higher oil import costs. However, the DEAT (2004: iv) cautions that South Africa’s coal 
and mining sectors are vulnerable to the steps taken by developed countries to mitigate 
climate change through reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
In addition, the costs of transporting our raw materials (such as agricultural products and 
mineral ores) to ports for export are very substantial. According to the IEA (2004: 178), 
for instance, “transport costs account for a large share of the total delivered price of coal”. 
In December 2003, mining and quarrying products together with coke and petrochemical 
products accounted for 42 per cent of goods transported by road by private sector 
enterprises in South Africa, based on tonnage (StatsSA, 2004). On the positive side, 
government’s recent desire to see more domestic benefi ciation of minerals and metals is 
likely to be given a boost by rising transport costs.4 The domestic petrochemicals industry 
relies partly on coal for feedstock in addition to crude oil, and thus may better withstand 
higher oil prices than in other some countries. 
Agriculture currently accounts for a very small share (around 5 per cent) of South Africa’s 
exports. The long-term decline of this sector has mirrored the international situation, in 
which world food exports as a proportion of total merchandise exports decreased from 
19.8 per cent in 1962 to 7.2 per cent in 2002 (World Bank, 2004). As will be seen below, 
South Africa may experience falling agricultural production in the coming years due to 
4  I owe this point to Anthony Leiman. 
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climate change, and therefore this sector’s contribution to export revenue is likely to 
decline further. 
Finally, South Africa’s tourism and hospitality sector will suffer reduced revenues as 
international transport becomes more expensive – particularly considering South Africa’s 
distance from wealthier nations whose citizens can (at least now) afford to travel. This 
puts in jeopardy the recent growth of this sector, which recently surpassed gold mining in 
terms of export revenue. 
 5.2 Other Macroeconomic Effects
The overall effect of the preceding sectoral shifts on South Africa’s balance of payments 
is hard to predict. While manufactured export revenues are likely to fall, these may be 
counterbalanced to some extent by rising receipts in the mining and possibly agricultural 
sector (provided the country is still able to produce signifi cant quantities for export in the 
face of climate change and oil depletion). While the rising cost of oil imports may impose 
severe balance of payments constraints on some oil-importing countries, particularly in 
a milieu of reduced trade, South Africa is in the fortunate position of not being overly 
dependent on oil imports. This is due in small part to modest domestic oil and gas reserves 
and in large part to Sasol’s successful synthetic fuels industry, which exploits our abundant 
coal reserves. Sasol is the largest synthetic fuels producer in the world (ABSA, 2004: 3). 
Oil constituted only 10 per cent of South Africa’s energy needs in 2002, and imported oil 
makes up about 60 per cent of South Africa’s annual liquid fuel consumption (EIA, 2005). 
Nonetheless, oil imports constitute approximately 6 per cent of total imports and are the 
single largest import item (ABSA, 2004: 5). As mentioned above, a rising oil import bill will 
be partially offset by higher coal exports. 
Another critical factor in South Africa’s future trade prospects is the path taken by the 
rand exchange rate. A gradual weakening of the dollar against other currencies as the 
US current account rebalances (as surely it must eventually do) could strengthen the 
rand, which has stronger bonds with the Euro. However, if the US economy experiences 
a hard landing with sharp dollar depreciation, as mentioned in section 4 this could 
trigger the withdrawal of portfolio investment from emerging markets, including South 
Africa, which are considered by investors as inherently risky. Perceptions of risk in SA 
are magnifi ed by its complex socio-economic problems, including HIV/Aids, poverty, and 
political and social unrest (of which there was considerable evidence in 2005, not least 
surrounding the indictment of Jacob Zuma on corruption charges). In addition, fl uctuating 
oil prices may cause a certain amount of exchange rate instability. Greater volatility would 
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exacerbate uncertainties for exporters and importers alike, and thus hamper both trade 
and investment. 
Experience has shown, especially in 2001-2, how a sharp depreciation in the rand 
exchange rate can cause a rapid rise in domestic price infl ation. A second important 
infl ation risk is rising fuel costs and associated second-round price effects, driven by 
higher crude oil prices. According to ABSA (2004: 5), “with a USD/ZAR exchange rate of 
R6,50, a $1 per barrel rise in international oil prices raises local petrol prices by about 8 
cents per litre.” Given the strict infl ation targeting framework being pursued by the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB), realisation of either or both of these infl ationary pressures 
would most likely prompt an interest rate hike. Indeed, throughout 2005 the Monetary 
Policy Committee of the SARB issued frequent warnings about the potentially infl ationary 
impact of high oil prices. Fortunately, as of early 2006 infl ation has not spiked and interest 
rates have remained unchanged, possibly due in part to the strong rand and defl ationary 
forces emanating from China and other East Asian producers. However, once the peak 
in all crude oil production is reached, we can reasonably expect prices to spiral upward. 
As argued in section 2, a tightening monetary policy response is likely to exacerbate 
the adverse impact of sustained oil price shocks by curtailing demand, investment and 
growth. 
PROVIDE (2005) employ a computable general equilibrium model in an attempt to discern 
the macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of an oil price shock. Their simulations suggest 
that a 20 per cent rise in the price of crude oil will reduce GDP by 1 per cent, while 
export-intensive sectors either benefi t or lose only marginally due to a positive terms 
of trade effect. Crucially, though, PROVIDE’s (2005) model makes several restrictive 
assumptions which limit its useful in the broader context of this paper. These (incorrect) 
assumptions include that: the petroleum sector is competitive rather than administered; 
there is no infl ation, even following the oil price shock; there is no fi nancial sector and 
hence no monetary policy response; and South African industry is characterised by perfect 
competition as opposed to being highly concentrated. Modelling the more complex reality 
is a daunting prospect. PROVIDE (2005) do acknowledge the limitations of their model, 
and demonstrate that allowing for a spill-over effect of higher oil prices onto other energy 
and energy-intensive commodities could benefi t the South African economy. 
More generally, the medium-term prospects for economic growth and employment hinge 
on many factors, not least of which are when the peak in world oil production passes, and 
whether the correction of global monetary imbalances results in a world-wide recession. 
When the US dollar does fi nally adjust, we can expect a signifi cant reduction in demand 
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for exports by the US, which is South Africa’s second largest trading partner after the EU. 
If overall volumes of international trade do fall, as was argued in section 2, then export 
sectors will most likely contract and thereby lead to a slow-down in economic growth and 
a loss of employment. 
In sum, the macroeconomic effects for South Africa of some of the risks to trade are 
uncertain, and in some instances may be positive, but overall they seem likely to be 
negative as far as growth is concerned. However, the concern should not only be with 
aggregate economic growth, but also with energy and food security and the impact on the 
poor. These issues are taken up in the following subsections. 
 5.3 Energy Security
South Africa relies on its abundant coal reserves for some three quarters of its total energy 
requirements (IEA, 2005), and as mentioned above only 10 per cent of energy needs are 
met by oil (see Figure 6). It also has a well-developed synthetic fuels industry. At fi rst 
glance, therefore, the country’s energy future looks reasonably secure. However, the 
transportation sector is highly dependent on oil and other liquid fuels. This in turn means 
that a wide range of goods prices are affected by oil prices, which are determined by 
world markets. The issue of transport infrastructure will therefore require critical attention 
from government. 
South Africa is unlikely to be the site of major international confl ict over energy as it 
does not possess signifi cant oil or gas reserves. Although this country does have very 
signifi cant coal reserves (some 5 per cent of the world total), it seems unlikely that this 
poses a geo-strategic risk since many high-energy consuming countries (including the 
US, Europe, Japan, China and India) either possess large domestic coal reserves or 
are geographically proximate to countries that do. While other countries in the Southern 
African region do depend on South Africa for energy, it seems improbable that they pose 
a signifi cant military threat. 
In the coming years, South Africa faces diffi cult decisions about the use of its abundant 
coal reserves as it increasingly experiences the effects of climate change. As one of 
the regions of the world expected to be most severely affected by climate change, the 
South African authorities really need to demonstrate to the international community their 
commitment to tackling the issue through reducing carbon emissions. This presents a 
signifi cant structural challenge to the South African economy, which has been accustomed 
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to cheap electricity derived from burning low-grade coal. It also limits the potential for 
further substitution of coal for oil (e.g. via synthetic fuels) if oil prices rise. 
Figure 6: Shares of total primary energy supply in South Africa, 2002
Source: IEA (2005)
 5.4 Food Security
Climate change is perhaps of greatest concern when it comes to food security. South 
Africa is currently in the fortunate position of being a net food exporter, for example selling 
maize to neighbouring countries and fruit to Europe. Agriculture accounts for about 8 per 
cent of total exports. However, the IPCC (2001) has singled out South Africa as being one 
of the regions of the world likely to be hardest hit by climate change. In general, average 
temperatures are expected to rise throughout the country by between 1 to 3 degrees 
Celsius, while rainfall is predicted to decline by between 5 to 10 per cent in the summer 
rainfall area (DEAT, 2004: 2). The occurrence of both droughts and fl oods is expected 
to increase. Many agricultural crops, such as maize and grapes, are sensitive to slight 
changes in average temperatures. Climate change therefore presents a potential threat 
to South Africa’s food security. 
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Rising oil prices also pose a risk to food security, as they incentivise some farmers to 
switch from food production to the production of biofuels. For instance it may become 
more profi table for maize farmers to supply their produce for biomass fuels such as 
ethanol and biodiesel rather than for food. In addition, Sasol has plans to construct a new 
plant at Secunda “to convert 400 000 tons of soya beans a year into 80 000 tons of diesel 
fuel” (ABSA, 2004: 5). If such developments occur on an international scale, as seems 
likely, then along with increasing transport costs they are likely to push up the prices of 
food staples. Such price increases will have serious consequences for the poor in South 
Africa and her neighbours, especially considering persistent droughts in the region. 
 5.5 Social Stability
Rising food and transport costs will affect the poor most, thereby exacerbating already high 
levels of inequality. Increasingly, satisfaction of the poor’s basic needs will be in jeopardy. 
HIV/AIDS mortality will be rising and will be compounded by hunger, malnutrition, and 
increasing joblessness. This in turn will place increasing strain on social services. At the 
same time, the provision of such services will be hampered as economic activity contracts 
and costs mount. This year has already witnessed an increase in social protests over lack 
of service delivery, so the scene is set for heightened social tensions in the future. 
The relative size and strength of South Africa’s economy in the context of Southern Africa 
means that this country is something of a regional magnet in times of crisis. Unless 
signifi cant foreign food aid arrives, South Africa can expect an increasing fl ood of 
refugees from neighbouring countries suffering from the effects of droughts, HIV/AIDS 
and Zimbabwe’s economic collapse. This would place a massive extra burden on already 
over-stretched social services. 
In sum, the probable impacts on South Africa of the major risk factors are wide-ranging 
and in many cases uncertain in both magnitude and quality. While some sectors (such as 
energy and resources) stand to benefi t, it seems clear that the poor will suffer signifi cantly 
unless specifi c ameliorative policies are implemented. Some possible responses are 
considered in the following section. 
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  6. Policy Response Options for South Africa
Given their systemic nature, the risk factors will potentially affect all sectors of South 
African society, including business, government and ordinary citizens. As such, every 
individual and organisation would be wise to consider the likely impact on them, and to 
prepare accordingly as best they can. This section, however, limits itself to a consideration 
of (some of) government’s possible responses to these risks. Section 7.1 briefl y discusses 
two major alternative strategies, namely adaptation and mitigation, and argues for a 
combination of the two. Section 7.2 details a number of specifi c policy response options.
 6.1 Adaptation and Mitigation
There are (at least) two related debates about the ways of responding to economic risks. 
One is between proponents of state intervention and those who favour market forces 
(laissez-faire). The other is between adaptation and mitigation. In general, advocates 
of market forces emphasise adaptation, while interventionists often promote mitigation 
strategies. However, proponents of government intervention may also support adaptive 
policy measures. 
Neoliberal ideology tends to oppose state intervention in favour of allowing market 
forces (the price mechanism) and technological innovations to coordinate adjustments. 
This view is premised on the belief that markets are more effi cient than governments 
in allocating resources. However, market failures are well known and are especially 
prevalent during economic downturns, when factors of production are underutilised. In 
addition, price signals are distorted by a range of existing taxes and subsidies, as well 
as asymmetric information, and for the most part do not account for externalities such as 
environmental and social costs. These distortions are especially relevant in the case of 
fossil fuels. Moreover, prices refl ect a combination of current scarcity and expectations 
of future scarcity, which may or may not be accurate refl ections of longer term realities. 
For example, the conventional view (as propounded by the IEA and most governments, 
for example) is that oil supplies will not begin to decline for several decades, whereas 
this paper argues this view is overly optimistic. A further problem with relying purely on 
market forces is that they tend to favour those who already have access to resources and 
to prejudice the poor, who are far more vulnerable to economic shocks. This is particularly 
relevant in South Africa given our extremely high unemployment and poverty rates. 
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On the other hand, neoliberals are correct to point out that a variety of government failures 
(e.g. inadequate implementation, rent-seeking behaviour and corruption) may in some 
cases aggravate economic problems. This depends on many factors within a particular 
country and should be taken into consideration when designing policies. It is also true 
that governments are responsible for many (but not all) price distortions in the economy. 
A pragmatic view is that government intervenes as it is, so it might as well be encouraged 
to do so in the most sensible (prudent) manner. 
The choice between adaptation and mitigation is partly a matter of time preference. 
Adaptation measures tend to focus on the short term (reactively coping with the immediate 
situation), while mitigation strategies are generally based on a long-term perspective 
(proactively reducing the risk of negative outcomes in the future). It is often argued that 
mitigation measures are warranted if the risks are very substantial, and indeed peak 
oil, climate change and global fi nancial instability are immense threats to the world and 
local economies. A common argument against mitigation efforts is that these will place 
excessive costs in the short term, for instance in terms of economic growth foregone. A 
counterargument is that the long-term costs of not taking mitigating action against severe 
risks are likely to far outweigh the short-term opportunity costs of such measures. 
The South African government has committed itself to the principles of sustainable 
development, which inherently takes a long-run view and recognises the rights and needs 
of future generations in addition to those of the present. It may seem to some observers 
that mitigating indeterminate risks (such as those described here) is less urgent than 
immediate concerns such as existing poverty and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, 
postponing appropriate medium-term interventions (such as described below) will merely 
compound these same problems in the long run. It is vitally important that investments 
such as these be made before the risks materialise into full-blown economic problems, 
otherwise suffi cient resources will not be available to do the job. For example, sky-high oil 
prices will make it much harder to build a replacement energy and transport infrastructure. 
A couple of quotes from the Hirsch Report (2005) on risk management relating to peak 
oil are instructive:
“with adequate, timely mitigation, the costs of [oil production] peaking 
can be minimized. If mitigation were to be too little, too late, world supply/
demand balance will be achieved through massive demand destruction 
(shortages), which would translate to signifi cant economic hardship” 
(Hirsch et al, 2005: 59). 
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“The world has never confronted a problem like this, and the failure to act 
on a timely basis could have debilitating impacts on the world economy. 
Risk minimization requires the implementation of mitigation measures well 
prior to peaking.” (Hirsch et al, 2005: 60). 
A similar argument applies to the risk of global fi nancial instability. Climate change, 
however, is already having various tangible effects and therefore requires adaptation 
strategies – in addition to mitigation efforts to attenuate the future impact. Likewise, high 
oil prices are already affecting the domestic economy, and especially the poor. 
Thus successful management of the risks identifi ed in this paper arguably will require both 
mitigation and adaptation strategies, and involve both market signals and government 
intervention. Broadly speaking, three avenues for effecting positive change are available 
to the authorities: the use of economic incentives such as taxes and subsidies; regulatory 
measures prescribing and proscribing certain kinds of activities; and education to raise 
public awareness and understanding of the issues. All three of these options should be 
utilised in a co-ordinated fashion for maximum effect. The following section outlines a 
variety of possible specifi c policy responses to the key socio-economic challenges 
identifi ed in the previous section. These suggestions are by no means purported to be a 
complete set of proposals, but rather a catalyst for discussion. 
 6.2 Precautionary Policy Measures
Numerous spheres of government policy are relevant to this discussion, but the focus 
here is on trade, fi scal, monetary, transport and social welfare policy. Each of these areas 
is considered in turn, whereafter some comments are made about synergistic policies and 
the need for government collaboration with domestic and foreign partners. The emphasis 
is on mitigation strategies, partly because adaptation will to some extent occur naturally 
as a result of market forces, and also because a long-term view is taken so as to minimize 
the negative impact of future risks. 
The main implication for trade policy (as indeed for other domains of government policy) 
is that it should not be premised on the status quo – highly globalised trade – necessarily 
being maintained. For the sake of prudence, South Africa’s policy-makers and trade 
negotiators acting within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and bilateral or multilateral 
forums should be informed by the future risks to trade. Trade policy should acknowledge 
the trade-off between the effi ciency of specialisation and the security of self-suffi ciency. 
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Where feasible under WTO rules, trade liberalisation should be limited in vulnerable and 
strategic sectors so as to maintain production capacity for the time when cheap imports 
are no longer available. In other words, policy should be geared towards avoiding de-
industrialisation (e.g. in the clothing and textile sector) as it will be much more diffi cult 
to re-establish such industries if and when the risks materialise (since these will likely 
induce recessionary conditions). At the same time, it will be important to try to ensure a 
suffi cient stream of export revenue to fi nance purchases of necessary imports such as 
capital equipment and oil. This may involve selected support of key export industries. 
A range of other government policies will also help to mitigate the effects of declining 
international trade. Fiscal policy should not attempt to buffer the effect of rising oil prices 
by subsidising petroleum, as this action will be unsustainable after the oil peak is passed. 
Rather, subsidies and taxes should be used to promote renewable energy sources, 
especially wind and solar. These will have the added benefi t of making energy more 
affordable to the poor, particularly in off-grid regions such as rural areas. The Treasury 
could also consider ways to boost domestic demand (especially for manufactured goods) 
since in future the export market is likely to contract substantially. 
In terms of monetary policy, the SARB would be wise to avoid excessive interest rate 
hikes in response to energy price rises. Rather, it should let the relative price changes 
occur (which realistically will only happen through overall infl ation) so that they refl ect 
changing scarcity patterns. Otherwise, the dampening effect of high energy (and related) 
prices on demand will be compounded by higher borrowing costs, and may worsen 
recessionary forces. However, if the oil price shocks are particularly severe, the SARB 
should obviously guard against hyperinfl ation. There are also good reasons for the SARB 
to take steps to shore up the capital account against excessive volatility. This could take 
the form of prudent exchange controls on portfolio fl ows, such as Malaysia has instituted, 
or the introduction of a Tobin tax. Such measures will help to reduce the uncertainty 
facing exporters and importers. Finally, the SARB would be well advised to diversify its 
foreign exchange holdings away from the US dollar, otherwise it faces a capital loss when 
the dollar adjusts to correct the US current account defi cit. 
Transport policy is another crucial area in light of the threat of rising oil prices and other 
transaction costs on trade. The government has already committed itself to expanding 
infrastructure spending over the next fi ve years, and has ear-marked considerable funds 
for this purpose. This golden opportunity should be utilised to upgrade and extend freight 
and public transport systems, particularly those which do not rely heavily on oil (e.g. 
electric rail networks). Such systems should not be geared only or mainly to existing, 
large-scale industries, but should also target underdeveloped local areas which lack 
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infrastructure. Such steps should also be supported by energy conservation measures, 
which could include reduced road speed limits, dedicated car-pool lanes, and park-and-
ride facilities in urban areas. In addition, effi ciency of fuel use could be encouraged, 
although the price mechanism will in large part take care of this. 
In the era of oil depletion, the reduction of distances between producers and consumers 
will to a large extent be unavoidable, but active policy steps can and should be taken to 
facilitate local economic development. This could include supply side measures such as 
municipal infrastructure projects and extension of basic services to underpin local trade. 
It will also require intensive training programmes to support import substituting industries 
as resources shift from the tradable to the nontradable sector. However, the demand side 
will also require attention, as noted above. This could involve job creation programmes 
and extension of credit facilities or income support to the poor. 
Financial support for the poor will be vital not just to boost local demand in order to 
stimulate supply, but also to alleviate chronic poverty, which as argued in section 5 
is otherwise likely to worsen considerably as a consequence of peak oil and climate 
change. Measures to enable the poor to afford food, energy and other basic necessities 
include expanded social grants (such as a basic income grant), or tradable fuel rations.5 
We have already mentioned the importance of protecting industrial capacity and jobs 
where feasible; this is no more important than in the area of poverty alleviation since 
wage income is so crucial in this respect. Job creation, already one of the country’s top 
policy issues, will most likely become even more important in the future. The government 
will also need to be careful that biofuel production does not crowd out food production 
to an extent that threatens food security. Accelerated land reform plus training of small-
scale farmers in organic and permaculture production techniques, will be another way of 
alleviating poverty and coping with rising fossil fuel prices. 
While many of these policy options would no doubt face substantial logistical hurdles 
and involve considerable costs, the social costs of not doing anything may be vast as 
joblessness, hunger and HIV/AIDS reinforce each other. Wherever possible government 
should design and implement synergic policies, which will simultaneously address several 
problems in a co-ordinated manner. Investing in renewable energy resources is foremost 
among these, since it will simultaneously reduce dependence on dwindling fossil fuels, 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and empower local communities and economies. 
Another is land reform and the promotion of organic farming, which obviates the need 
5  See Feasta (2005) on energy rationing. 
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for fossil fuel based fertilisers and pesticides while also absorbing more labour. A third 
is energy rationing, which could help to cut down carbon emissions (if the total amount 
of rations declines over time) while protecting the poor from the impact of rising energy 
costs. 
Action will need to be taken at all levels of government, including local, provincial and 
national. In addition, the government will need to co-operate both with domestic business, 
labour and civil society organisations, and forge stronger partnerships with foreign 
governments and multilateral agencies to deal with these challenges. The onus, however, 
is not just on the state, but also on fi rms, NGOs, communities and individual citizens to 
make appropriate behavioural adjustments. 
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  7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has identifi ed several major areas of risk facing global trade, including 
natural resource, environmental, fi nancial and associated geopolitical factors. The main 
uncertainty is arguably around the timing of these events, and not the probability of their 
occurrence. Oil depletion is a living reality, and it is just a matter of time before the peak 
in global production is reached, after which the price will become more volatile around 
a rising trend. Climate change, as a result of global warming and changing land-use 
patterns, is already producing visible and costly effects, and these are set to worsen 
substantially over the coming decades. The American current account defi cit cannot 
continue to grow indefi nitely, and the dollar must therefore adjust at some point, and 
probably within the next few years. 
Each of these risk factors could in its own right have substantial negative consequences 
for economies and societies, and in particular seriously inhibit the international fl ow of 
goods and services. Together, they present a mine-fi eld of potential hazards which could 
coalesce into a ‘perfect storm’. This is because there are several complex feedback loops 
among the risk factors, which raise the probability and magnitude of adverse outcomes. 
Taken together, the system – like the global climate itself – is perhaps best characterised 
as complex, dynamic and nonlinear. As such, modelling it is an extremely diffi cult exercise. 
However, one does not have to be mathematically precise to grasp the nature of the 
interactions and their importance. Some of the main linkages may be summarised as 
follows (see Figure 7 for a diagrammatic representation): 
Declining fossil fuel energy resources (especially oil) will likely lead to:
higher costs of long-distance trade and therefore reduced exports and  
 imports;
rising world agricultural input costs and food prices in the face of growing   
 population and food requirements;
increased use of coal, which would accelerate the global warming process;   
 on the other hand, renewable energy resources will become more    
 fi nancially attractive, and this could help to reduce carbon emissions;
increasing pressure on the US dollar in particular and the world economy in  
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intensifi ed competition over resources, possibly provoking trade wars or   
 military wars, which would further weaken the global economy and trade. 
Climate change is likely to:
raise the transaction costs associated with international trade and cause   
 logistical disruptions; 
cause more frequent and severe droughts and fl oods and therefore reduce   
 crop yields on average; 
create streams of environmental refugees, which will concentrate pressure   
 on resources in certain countries and regions and thereby heighten   
 geopolitical tensions; 
further pressure nations to reduce energy consumption so as to limit   
 greenhouse gas emissions, and thereby place an additional brake on   
 economic activity;
cause more frequent natural disasters and thereby put increasing strain on   
 the world economy, insurance industry and fi nancial system; 
raise sea levels dramatically in the long term, with far-reaching effects on   
 human societies. 
Global macro-economic instability may:
result in a hard landing for the US and world economy, reducing trade in   
 particular, and in the worst case cause a major stock market collapse and   
 economic depression; 
diminish the capacity of economies to invest in renewable energy resources  
 and therefore compound the looming energy crisis;
foment geopolitical tensions by causing economic hardship in the short to   
 medium term; on the other hand it could in the long term help to rebalance   
 trade and fi nancial fl ows, reduce US hegemony and improve the    
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If this complex web of risks is not managed appropriately, there is a signifi cant likelihood 
of a downward spiral of economic depression, confl ict and suffering. As a result of 
the interconnected and systemic nature of the risks, they need to be addressed in an 
integrated manner. It is also important to acknowledge the large uncertainties surrounding 
possible outcomes. The role of technological change has always been central to economic 
development, and it will no doubt play a key role in the future as humanity grapples with 
these challenges. Indeed, many of the technologies needed to overcome these challenges 
are already available. However, the potential of technology depends on the political will 
to use it and the wisdom with which it is applied. Similarly, relying exclusively either on 
markets or on government intervention is likely to fail; a co-ordinated response involving 
both is essential. Crucially, delaying appropriate responses in the short to medium run will 
exacerbate the problems in the long run. 
The implications for South Africa are diverse and uncertain, but there are several probable 
negative outcomes. The likely impact on imports and exports, the balance of trade and 
the exchange rate are ambiguous, and different sectors will be variously affected. The 
macro-economy is likely to suffer overall from each of the three risks, and our fi nancial 
markets are highly exposed to international contagion. While energy security on its own 
might not be overly problematic given the abundance of coal reserves, in the context of 
rapid global warming this presents considerable environmental and structural economic 
challenges. Food security may also be threatened, especially if world food prices rise and 
domestic production is substantially channelled toward biofuel production, as already 
appears to be happening. The country’s poorer citizens are especially at risk, and this 
could have implications for social and political stability. In the face of these risks, the 
South African government would be well advised to implement mitigating strategies. 
Adaptation measures will also be required, such as are already being formulated in the 
case of climate change. Once again, the timeliness of interventions is very important, as 
is co-operation between different segments of government and the broader society. 
Extensive further research on these issues is warranted, given the relatively low level of 
attention they are currently receiving, from economists in particular. One aspect would be 
further work to quantify the impact of oil price and fi nancial shocks on the South African 
economy through macro-econometric and computable general equilibrium models. 
Another is an engagement of economists with climate change scientists to thrash out the 
economic implications of global warming and adaptation and mitigation strategies. A third 
would be assessing the likely impact on the poor of the three main risk factors. A fourth 
area is the potential of biofuel production to deal simultaneously with fossil fuel depletion, 
carbon emissions and job creation. 
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Finally, not all of these challenges are entirely negative. In some ways they represent 
opportunities to shift to a more democratic, egalitarian and ecologically sound global 
and local economic system than that which prevails at present. Whether these positive 
opportunities can be realised will depend on the active participation of and co-operation 
among all sectors of society, including government, business and civil society, at both 
national and international levels. The future is ours for the making. 
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